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We study a model of collective decision making with endoge-
nous information collection. Agents collect information about
the consequences of a project, communicate, and then vote on
the project. We examine under what conditions communication
may increase the probability that good decisions are made. Our
most surprising result is that when there are no direct cost of
communication and communication can only help to identify the
truth, more communication may reduce the probability that a
correct decision is made. The reason for this result is that com-
munication may aggravate the free-rider problem associated with
collecting information. (JEL: D78, D83)
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1 Introduction
Almost all economic models describe a silent world. In the real world people
talk. McCloskey and Klamer [1995] have assessed that in 1993 in the
United States about a quarter of working time was spent on talk. Talk, or
more specifically, arguing or debate, takes place especially when collective
choices are made. Often collective decision procedures leave plenty of room
for debate. A rationale for debate is learning. Different individuals often have
different pieces of information about the consequences of alternative choices.
Debate is a means of revealing private information (Fearon, [1998]). In ad-
dition, debate may reveal the strength of arguments. Sometimes arguments
are decisive. Sometimes they are weak or even plainly wrong. Debate may
contribute to distinguishing wrong from strong arguments.
Not everybody holds an optimistic view of debate. In ancient Greece,
people already worried about the possibility that eloquent speakers could
convince individuals of false opinions. Moreover, debate takes time, while
in practice decisions often have to be reached sooner rather than later. An
obvious cost of debate is therefore postponement of reaching decisions.
This paper is concerned with the consequences of engaging in debate for
agents’ incentives to collect information. We analyze a model in which two
agents with the same preferences have to make a binary decision about a
public project under uncertainty. The agents follow a decision procedure
which consists of three stages. In the first stage, each agent acquires infor-
mation about the consequences of the project. The quality of the collected
information depends on the effort an agent has put in acquiring information.
Thus, information is endogenous in our model. In the second stage of the
decision process the agents communicate. We do not model how agents com-
municate. Instead, we model one possible consequence of communication:
communication may change an agent’s opinion about which policy alterna-
tive is optimal. We model two views of communication, an optimistic and a
pessimistic view. In the optimistic view, an agent who has incorrect informa-
tion may learn from the other agent who has correct information. The idea
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behind this view is that people make mistakes, and that debate sometimes
reveals mistakes. We refer to this case as the “optimistic” view of commu-
nication: given the quality of information, communication can only help to
identify the truth. In the pessimistic view, communication may also lead
to deception: an agent with incorrect information may mislead an informed
agent. The idea behind this view is that arguments are sometimes won by
eloquence rather than logic. After the two agents have communicated they
vote on the project in the third stage of the decision process.
The punch line of this paper is that the possibility of communication
affects the effort an agent puts into acquiring information. When information
is cheap or easy to obtain, the possibility of communication reduces effort.
When information is expensive or difficult to obtain, communication increases
effort. To see why, suppose that information is almost free. Then agent 1
considers it very likely that agent 2 has received correct information. This
reduces agent 1’s incentives to collect information. When information is
expensive, it is far less likely that agent 2 has received correct information.
Since communication makes it possible to inform agent 2, this increases agent
1’s incentive to collect information. We show that even if we take the
optimistic view of communication and abstract from direct costs of debate,
increasing the scope of communication may be sub-optimal from a welfare
point of view.
Our paper is related to the literature on strategic information transmis-
sion. There the emphasis has been on the conditions under which messages
can be trusted. The basic insight is that communication between individu-
als requires a certain amount of common interest (Crawford and Sobel
[1982], Farrell and Rabin [1996], and Banerjee and Somanathan
[2001]). Schultz [1996], Letterie and Swank [1997],Martinelli [2001],
and Heidhues, and Lagerlöf [2003] study information transmission in a
political setting. Our paper deviates from this literature in two ways. First,
we do not assume a given distribution of information. Agents must be mo-
tivated to collect information. Second, we assume a common interest. We
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emphasize the consequences of communication rather than the possibility of
communication.
Our paper is also related to the literature on jury and committee decision
making (Nitzan and Paroush [1982, 1985], Sah and Stiglitz [1988],
Austen-Smith and Banks [1996], and Persico [2000]). This literature
analyzes the informational efficiency of alternative voting rules. As in this
literature, in our analysis agents sometimes make mistakes. These mistakes
form the rationale for collective decision making. However, in the literature
on jury and committee decision making agents are usually explicitly assumed
not to communicate. We examine the conditions under which communication
among agents increases the mean quality of accepted projects.
Finally, this paper is inspired by the recent literature on deliberative
democracy (see Elster [1998] for a recent survey of interesting articles).
This literature reminds us what ordinary people already know: people talk
for various reasons. We have modeled one of these reasons: communication
as a means of correcting mistakes.
Our paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model.
Section 3 analyzes the model when agents cannot communicate. The out-
comes serve as a benchmark for analyzing the consequences of communica-
tion. Section 4 allows for the optimistic view of communication. In Section
5, we add a pessimistic view. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
Two agents, i ∈ {1, 2} have to decide whether to implement a project, X = 1,
or to reject it, X = 0. There are two states of the world, S ∈ {−h, h}. The
expected benefit of the project is denoted by p. We assume that p < 0.1
The two agents have identical preferences over decisions and states. They
1The analysis of the case where p > 0 is analogous.
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are represented by:
ui(X = 1 | S = h) = p+ h(1)
ui(X = 1 | S = −h) = p− h
ui(X = 0 | S = h) = ui(X = 0 | S = −h) = 0.
We assume that p + h > 0. Eq. (1) thus implies that both agents prefer
implementation to rejection if S = h and rejection to implementation if
S = −h.
Agents do not know the state of the world, however. Both states have
equal prior probability. Each agent receives a private signal, si ∈ {−h, h},
about the true state. A signal is fully informative, that is a signal re-
veals the state of the world, with probability π (ei), where ei denotes the
effort agent i has put in collecting information. If si is informative, then
Pr (S = h | si = h) = 1 and Pr (S = −h | si = −h) = 1. If both s1 and s2
are informative, then s1 = s2. A signal is uninformative with probabil-
ity 1 − π(ei). An uninformative signal does not contain information about
the state of the world. Thus, if a signal is uninformative, then si is ran-
domly drawn from {−h, h} with Pr(−h) = 1
2
. The function π (ei) shows
the relationship between effort and the quality of a signal. We assume that
π (0) = 0, π0 (ei) > 0, and π00(ei) < 0. Effort is costly. Agent i’s payoff is
given by ui(·)− c(ei), where c(ei) denotes the costs of effort. We assume that
c(0) = 0, c0(ei) > 0, and c00(ei) > 0. When an agent has received a signal, he
does not know whether the signal is informative or uninformative. He knows,
however, the relationship between effort and the probability of receiving an
informative signal.
After the agents have received their signal, they can deliberate which
decision should be made. We do not model how agents deliberate. Instead,
we model possible consequences of deliberation. We assume that deliberation
may affect an agent’s perception of the state of the world. We first take an
optimistic view of deliberation. In this view, an agent who has received
an informative signal may affect the beliefs of an agent who has received a
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wrong signal. Next, we add a pessimistic view. An agent who has received
a wrong signal may affect the beliefs of the other agent who has received an
informative signal.
At the end of the game, each agent votes on the project, vi ∈ {N,Y }.
With two individuals there are two sensible voting rules: implementation
requires that both individuals vote for implementation, (v1, v2) = (Y, Y ), and
status quo requires that both agents vote for status quo, (v1, v2) = (N,N).
In the main text we restrict attention to the first voting rule. The Appendix
deals with the second voting rule. Table 1 gives a formal description of the
game without deliberation.
Table 1: The Timing of the Model
Players: i ∈ {1, 2}.
Timing:
• Nature randomly chooses S ∈ {−h, h}, with Pr (S = h) = 1
2
.
• Each player i chooses ei > 0.
• Each player i observes si ∈ {−h, h}: Pr (si = S) = 12 [1 + π (ei)]
and Pr (si 6= S) = 12 [1− π (ei)].
• Each player i chooses vi ∈ {N, Y }.
Payoffs:
If (v1,v2) = (Y, Y ), then Ui (S = h) = p+ h− c (ei) and
Ui (S = −h) = p− h− c (ei).
If (v1,v2) 6= (Y, Y ), then Ui = −c (ei).
Assumptions:
p < 0; πi (0) = 0, π0 (ei) > 0, and π00(ei) ≤ 0; c (0) = 0, c0 (ei) > 0,
and c00(ei) > 0.
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As usual in voting games, our game has many equilibria. We restrict
attention to symmetric Nash equilibria in which players follow pure strategies.
We are aware that “nonsymmetric Nash equilibria” exist. Specifically, agent
1 may always vote “yes”, thereby delegating the decision to agent 2. Models
of delegation abound. We instead focus our attention on communication
rather than on delegation.
3 A Benchmark: No Deliberation
In this section, we assume that no deliberation takes place. Agents vote on
the project immediately after they have received their signal. The model of
Section 2 then reduces to a conventional two-person model without commu-
nication. Each agent makes two decisions. First, each agent chooses how
much effort to put in collecting information. Second, each agent chooses how
to vote.
First consider agents’ vote decisions. Lemma 1 presents the condition
under which it is optimal for agent 1 (2) to vote in line with his signal, given
that the other agent also votes in line with his signal.
Lemma 1 Suppose a level of effort e = e1 = e2 so that 12 [1 + (π (e))2] p +
π (e)h > 0. Then, it is optimal for agent 1 to vote in line with his signal,
given that the other agent votes in line with his signal.
Proof. Suppose e1 = e2, and that agent 2 follows his signal. It is easy to
see that if agent 1 has received s1 = −h, v1 = Y weakly dominates v1 = N .
If agent 1 has received s1 = h, v1 = Y yields an expected payoff equal to
1
2
[1 + (π (e1))2] p + π (e1)h − c(e1). Voting v1 = N yields a payoff equal to
−c(e1). Hence, given s1 = h, agent 1 votes v1 = Y if 12 [1 + (π (e))2] p +
π (e)h > 0. The analogous argument applies to agent 2.
Now consider agents’ decisions how much effort to put in collecting in-
formation. When the agents vote in line with their signal, the project will
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be rejected unless both agent receive a positive signal. Consequently, when
choosing effort agent 1’s expected payoff equals:
1
2
{π(e1)π(e2) + 1
2
π(e1) [1− π(e2)] +
1
2
π(e2) [1− π(e1)] +
1
4
[1− π(e1)](2)
[1− π(e2)] }(p+ h) + 1
2
{1
4
[1− π(e1)] [1− π(e2)] }(p− h)− c (e1) .
We can write an analogous expression for agent 2. Differentiating (2) with
respect to e1 yields the first-order condition:
(3)
1
4
∂π (e1)
∂e1
[h+ π (e2) p]−
∂c (e1)
∂e1
= 0.
Eq. (3) implicitly defines agent 1’s effort as a function of h, p, and e2.
Application of the implicit function theorem yields the intuitive result that
effort e1 is increasing in h and p and decreasing in e2.
We can now characterize an equilibrium of the game. Let e∗1 solve (3).
Furthermore, suppose that for e∗1 = e∗2, the condition in Lemma 1 holds.
Then, the equilibrium exists, in which (i) each agent chooses effort e∗ND =
e∗1(h, p) = e∗2(h, p) and (ii) each agent votes informative.
Apart from this equilibrium, there exists an uninformative equilibrium.
In the uninformative equilibrium, each agent does not exert effort and always
votes for rejection. If the condition in Lemma 1 is violated, an equilibrium
may exist in which the decision about the project is delegated to an agent, say
agent 1. Clearly, without communication, delegation raises a coordination
problem.
Using the equilibrium strategies of the two players it is easy to calculate
the expected total surplus, that is the sum of the expected payoff to the two
agents:
(4) SND =
1
2
p{1 + [π(e∗ND)]2}+ π(e∗ND)h− 2c (e∗ND) .
It is worth noting that from a social point of view, the agents exert too little
effort. Thus, e∗ND does not maximize (4). The reason is a positive externality.
When agent 1 increases his effort to receive an informative signal, agent 2
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also benefits. The social benefits of collecting information thus exceed the
private benefits.
4 Taking an “Optimistic” View of Delibera-
tion
In this section, we take an optimistic view of deliberation. We assume that
if an agent has received an informative signal, say agent i, and the other
agent has received a wrong signal, say agent j, then with probability α agent
j learns that his signal is wrong. The idea is that through communication
a wrongly informed agent may learn from an informed agent the true state
of the world. Formally, we add a stage to the basic model presented in
Table 1. After the agents have received their signal, but before they vote,
the agents communicate. If the agents have received conflicting signals, they
may learn the true state through communication. Specifically: suppose that
the agents have received conflicting signals and that an agent has received an
informative signal and the other agent has received an uninformative signal,
then with probability α both agents learn the true state.2
As the model of Section 3, the present model has two symmetric Nash
equilibria: an informative and uninformative one. As before and for the same
reason, we ignore the uninformative equilibrium.
A direct consequence of deliberation is that agents do not always vote
in line with their signal. An agent may vote against his signal when he has
2A similar assumption could be made for the case where the agents receive the same sig-
nal. However, we assume that if {s1, s2} = {h, h}, then the agents choose implementation
anyway.
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learned that his signal is wrong. Agent 1 votes as follows:3,4
(a) he votes for implementation with probability one if he has received
signal s1 = h and the state of the world is S = h;
(b) he votes for rejection with probability one if he has received signal
s1 = −h and the state of the world is S = −h;
(c) he votes with probability α for implementation if he has received the
wrong signal s1 = −h and agent 2 has received an informative signal;
(d) he votes with probability α for rejection, if he has received the wrong
signal s1 = h and agent 2 has received an informative signal.
Because of symmetry, agent 2 votes in a similar way as agent 1. How
much effort do the agents put into collecting information, given that they
will vote as described above? When agent 1 chooses effort, his expected
payoff is:
1
2
{π(e1)π(e2) + 1
2
π(e1) [1− π(e2)] (1 + α) +
1
2
π(e2) [1− π(e1)](5)
(1 + α) + 1
4
[1− π(e1)] [1− π(e2)] }(p+ h) + 1
2
{1
4
[1− π(e1)]
[1− π(e2)] }(p− h)− c (e1) .
Differentiating (5) with respect to e1 yields the first-order condition:
(6)
1
4
∂π (e1)
∂e1
½
h+ π (e2) p+ 2α
·
1
2
− π (e2)
¸
(p+ h)
¾
− ∂c (e1)∂e1
= 0.
An analogous condition can be derived for e2. Eq. (6) implicitly defines e1
as a function of h, α, p, and e2.
3Through deliberation, information can be shared. Since there is no conflict of interest,
agents may always prearrange to vote in the same way. One may even expect that the
agents will vote in the same way. In case of conflicting signals (ex post), each agent prefers
rejection of the project to implementation. It is important to note that allowing for agree-
ments on voting behavior does not affect our results. The reason is that implementation
requires two agents to vote for implementation. Furthermore, note that if an agent has
learned from the other agent, agents know the state of the world.
4Throughout this section we assume that π(ei)h > |p|.
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Proposition 1 Suppose that the level of effort is sufficiently high to induce
sincere voting. Then, effort is a decreasing function of α if and only if 1
2
<
π(e∗2) < 1.
Proof. Immediate from application of the implicit function theorem to (6).
Proposition 1 implies that the opportunity of deliberation may reduce
agents’ effort to collect information. The intuition behind this result is
straightforward. When choosing effort, an agent compares the costs and
benefits of effort. In our model, there are two types of benefits. First, by ex-
erting more effort, the agent reduces the probability that he receives a wrong
signal. Second, through the opportunity of deliberation, exerting more effort
reduces the probability that the other agent bases his vote on a wrong sig-
nal. However, deliberation also reduces the cost of receiving a wrong signal.
The reason is that deliberation makes it possible that a wrong signal will be
corrected.
Using (5), it is easy to calculate the total expected surplus in the present
model:
(7)
SOV =
1
2
p
©
1 + [π(e∗OV )]2
ª
+π(e∗OV )h+π (e∗OV ) [1− π (e∗OV )]α (p+ h)−2c (e∗OV ) .
where e∗OV denotes the equilibrium effort level in the game with an optimistic
view of deliberation. Does deliberation always improve social welfare? To
answer this question, compare (4) with (7). Allowing for deliberation has
two effects. First, given effort, deliberation increases the probability that
the correct decision will be made (if e∗ND = e∗OV , then the third term of
the right-hand side of (7) implies that SOV > SND). Second, as discussed
above the opportunity of deliberation affects effort. If effort increases, the
opportunity of deliberation unambiguously enhances expected social welfare.
If effort decreases, the welfare effect of deliberation is ambiguous. A higher
value of α, which can be interpreted as giving more room for communication,
may decrease expected social welfare.
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We illustrate the effect of deliberation on total expected social surplus
with a numerical example. Let π(ei) = 0.8ei, c(ei) = 12λe
2
i with λ > 0, h = 2,
and p = −1. Figure 1 and 2, illustrate the effect of α on the total expected
social surplus in the case of γ = 0.5 and 0.17, respectively. In Figure 1, an
increase in α leads to an increase in the total expected social surplus. The
reason is that 0 < π(e∗) < 1
2
holds for all values of α. Figure 2 shows that
an increase in α may lead to a decrease in the total expected social surplus.
The parameter values now ensure that 1
2
< π(e∗) < 1.
Figure 1 0 < π(e∗) < 1
2
; γ = 0.8, λ = 0.5, p = −1, h = 2.
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Figure 2 1
2
< π(e∗) < 1; γ = 0.8, λ = 0.17, p = −1, h = 2.
5 Adding a “Pessimistic” View of Delibera-
tion to the Model
We now add a more sceptical view of deliberation to our model. We assume
that with probability β an agent, say agent i, who has received a wrong
signal, convinces an agent, say agent j, who has received a different, possibly
informative, signal that j’s signal is wrong. We maintain α in the model. We
exclude the possibility that i convinces j and j convinces i simultaneously.5
Throughout the remaining part of this section we assume that it is optimal
for each agent to vote in line with his (posterior) perception of the true state
of the world. Agent 1 thus votes as follows:
(a) when he receives the same signal as agent 2 he always votes in line
with his signal;
(b) when he receives a correct signal and agent 2 receives a wrong signal,
he votes in line with his own signal with probability 1− β;
5Excluding this possibility does not affect our main results.
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(c) when he receives a wrong signal and agent 2 receives an informative
signal, he votes with probability 1− α in line with his own signal.
The expected payoff to agent 1 when he chooses effort equals:
1
2
{π(e1)π(e2) + 1
2
π(e1) [1− π(e2)] (1 + α) +
1
2
π(e2) [1− π(e1)](8)
(1 + α) + 1
4
[1− π(e1)] [1− π(e2)] (1 + 2β)}(p+ h) +
1
2
{1
2
π (e1) [1− π (e2)]β +
1
2
π (e2) [1− π (e1)]β +
1
4
[1− π(e1)]
[1− π(e2)] (1 + 2β)}(p− h)− c (e1) .
Differentiating (8) with respect to e1 yields the first-order condition:
(9)
1
4
∂π(e1)
∂e1
{h+π(e2)p+(p+h)(α−β)+2π(e2)[hβ−α(p+h)]}−∂c(e1)∂e1 = 0.
Eq. (9) implicitly defines e1 as a function of h, p, α, β, and e2. By application
of the implicit function theorem, it is easy to show that e1 is a decreasing
function of β if and only if π (e∗2) < h+p2h . The total expected social surplus
is:
SPV =
1
2
p+ [π (e∗PV )]2[
1
2
p+ α(−p− h) + hβ] +(10)
π (e∗PV ) [(α− β)(p+ h) + h] + pβ − 2c (e∗PV ) .
where e∗PV denotes the equilibrium level of effort in the present game. Anal-
ogous to the results of the previous section we can show that for small values
of π (e∗PV ), the welfare effect of an increase in β is ambiguous. Hence, if more
communication implies a higher probability that a person who has wrong
information convinces a person who has good information, then more com-
munication does not always increase the probability of good public decisions.
The main reason for this result is that agents may respond to the adverse
consequences of communication by putting more effort in collecting informa-
tion.
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6 Conclusion
Correcting mistakes and sharing information are two well-known rationales
for deliberation. In this paper, we have examined the conditions under which
deliberation improves collective decision making. Our most surprising result
is that when there are no direct cost of communication and communication
can only convince uninformed or wrongly informed agents of the truth, more
communication may reduce the probability that a correct decision is made.
The reason for this result is that communication may aggravate the free-rider
problem associated with collecting information. Especially, when information
is cheap, or good information is easy to acquire, more communication reduces
agents’ incentives to collect information. When collecting information is
expensive, more communication usually increases the probability of good
collective decisions.
We are aware that our results are derived from a highly stylized model
based on many restrictive assumptions. Some assumptions were made for
simplicity and are innocuous. Relaxing them does not affect the main re-
sults qualitatively. For instance, the assumption that there are only two
states and that they occur with the same prior probability is not important.
Adding individuals to the group is not likely to affect our main results either.
Of course, the free-rider problem aggravates. This reduces the probability
that an individual receives an informative signal. On the other hand, the
probability that some individual receives an informative signal may rise. A
complication is that the probability of learning may depend on the number
of individuals in the group. A less innocuous assumption is that individuals
have the same preferences. We conjecture that introducing conflict of interest
into our model may jeopardize communication among agents.
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Appendix
This Appendix analyzes deliberation under the alternative voting rule: im-
plementation requires one vote. Again we focus on symmetric equilibria in
pure strategies. We focus on agent 1. As the results are qualitatively the
same as in the main text, we hardly comment on our results.
Case I: A Benchmark: No Deliberation
As implementation requires one vote, the expected payoff to agent 1 is
given by:
1
2
½
1− 1
4
[1− π(e1)][1− π(e2)]
¾
(p+ h) + 1
2
{1
2
π(e1) [1− π(e2)](A1)
+
1
2
π(e2) [1− π(e1)] +
3
4
[1− π(e1)] [1− π(e2)] }(p− h)− c (e1) .
Differentiating (A1) with respect to e1 yields the first-order condition:
(A2)
1
4
∂π (e1)
∂e1
[h− π (e2) p]−
∂c (e1)
∂e1
= 0.
Eq. (A.2) implicitly defines e1 as a function of h, p, and e2,. As in the main
text, effort is increasing in h and decreasing in p and in e2.
The total expected social surplus is:
(A3) SND0 =
1
2
p
©
3− [π (e∗ND0)]2
ª
+ hπ (e∗ND0)− 2c (e∗ND0) .
where e∗ND0 denotes the equilibrium effort level with no deliberation.
Case II: Taking an Optimistic View of Deliberation
The expected payoff to agent 1 when he chooses effort equals:
1
2
½
1− 1
4
[1− π(e1)][1− π(e2)]
¾
(p+ h) + 1
2
{1
2
π(e1) [1− π(e2)] (1− α)(A4)
1
2
π(e2) [1− π(e1)] (1− α) +
3
4
[1− π(e1)] [1− π(e2)] }(p− h)− c(e1).
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Differentiating (A4) with respect to e1 yields the first-order condition:
(A5)
1
4
∂π (e1)
∂e1
{h− pπ (e2) + α(p− h)[2π (e2)− 1]}− ∂c (e1)∂e1 = 0.
An analogous condition can be derived for e2. Eq. (A5) implicitly defines e1
as a function of e2, p, h, and α. Application of the implicit function theorem
shows that e1 is a decreasing function of α if and only if 12 < π (e∗2) < 1. The
result is analogous to that of Section 4.
By using Eq. (A5), the total expected social surplus is:
(A6)
SOV 0 =
1
2
p
©
3− [π (e∗OV 0)]
2ª+hπ (e∗OV 0)+π (e∗OV 0) [1− π (e∗OV 0)]α(h−p)−2c (e∗OV 0) .
where e∗OV 0 denotes the equilibrium effort level in the game with an optimistic
view. As in Section 4, the total expected social surplus may decrease in α.
Case III: Adding a Pessimistic View of Deliberation to the
Model
The expected payoff to agent 1 when he chooses effort is given by:
(A7)
1
2
{1− 1
4
[1− π(e1)][1− π(e2)](1 + 2β)−
1
2
π(e1) [1− π(e2)]β
−1
2
π(e2) [1− π(e1)]β}(p+ h) + 1
2
{1
2
π(e1) [1− π(e2)] +
1
2
π(e2) [1− π(e1)]
+
3
4
[1− π(e1)] [1− π(e2)]−
1
2
π(e1) [1− π(e2)]α−
1
2
π(e2) [1− π(e1)]α
−1
2
[1− π(e1)] [1− π(e2)]β}(p− h)− c(e1).
Differentiating (A7) with respect to e1 yields the first-order condition:
(A8)
1
4
∂π(e1)
∂e1
{h− pπ(e2)− (p− h)(α− β) + 2π(e2) [hβ + α(p− h)]}−∂c(e1)∂e1 = 0.
Eq. (A8) implicitly defines e1 as a function of e2, p, h, α, and β. Application
of the implicit function theorem shows that e1 is an decreasing function of β
if and only if π(e∗2) < h−p2h .
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